Abstract: IEEE 802 standards ease the deployment of networking infrastructures and enable employers to access corporate networks while travelling. These standards provide two modes of communication called infrastructure and ad hoc modes. A security solution for the IEEE 802.11's infrastructure mode took several years to reach maturity and firmware is still been upgraded, yet a solution for the ad hoc mode needs to be specified. This paper is a first attempt in this direction. It leverages the latest developments in the area of password-based authentication and (group) Diffie-Hellman key exchange to develop a provably secure key-exchange protocol for IEEE 802.11's ad hoc mode. The protocol allows users to securely join and leave the wireless group at time, accommodates either a single-shared password or pairwise-shared passwords among the group members or at least with a central server; achieves security against dictionary attacks in the ideal-hash model (i.e. random oracles). This is, to the best of our knowledge, the first such protocol to appear in the cryptographic literature.
Introduction
Wireless technology enables us to use our laptops on the couch at home or in hotel rooms and gives us flexibility in where and when we work in the business environments. This technology makes it very easy to connect devices (Wi-Fi Alliance, 2007) . We only have to insert a wireless card into our laptop to establish radio link communications with fixed access points through which we talk to other devices and access the internet. In this infrastructure mode, our laptop joins the network by discovering a wireless access point and negotiating with it the necessary temporal keys. The IEEE 802.11 working group defined the mechanisms for negotiating these keys via the Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) and the 802.11i standards (Wi-Fi Alliance, 2007; Winget et al., 2003) . A simpler communication infrastructure for users that do not need broadband connectivity is to transmit data by means of the devices themselves. This networking infrastructure allows rapid developments and minimizes costs since wireless access points do not need to be deployed.
Wireless devices have the ability to operate an ad hoc mode as specified by the IEEE 802.11 standards; however, the WPA protocol does not currently provide a security solution for it. The first solution that comes to mind is to maintain a group key for each sending device and to distribute the key to all the other devices using pairwise keys established by WPA. This solution, however, becomes impractical for groups of more than ten devices as the number of keys grows exponentially in the number of devices. Another solution is to develop a provably secure group Diffie-Hellman protocol for the IEEE 802.11i standard. As wireless technology matures and bugs are fixed, the infrastructure and ad hoc modes will complement each other to bring the internet where broadband communication infrastructures do not currently exist (Motorola Inc., 2004; PacketHop Inc., 2006) .
Wireless networks provide security researchers with an opportunity to develop provably secure cryptographic technologies that will play an essential role in the deployment of broadband communication infrastructures. This paper is a first attempt in this direction. It develops a provably secure password-based group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol for IEEE 802.11's ad hoc mode, by extending the work of Bresson et al. (2002) in three ways.
Its first contribution is to accommodate a single-shared password or pairwise-shared passwords among the group members or at least with a central server; unlike Bresson et al. who only allow for a single-shared password. Passwords are indeed frequently shared between users and taken advantage of to exchange a group session key. For example, a Bluetooth piconet is set-up once the devices have exchanged a group session via a two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol whose flows are encrypted using pairwise-shared passwords (The Official Bluetooth Membership Site, 2006) . A piconet is also limited to eight devices.
Our second contribution in this paper is efficiency by allowing users to securely join and leave the wireless group at any time -the so-called dynamic case. The dynamic group Diffie-Hellman key exchange using public-key cryptography was dealt with in Bresson et al. (2001) , yet the passwordbased group Diffie-Hellman key exchange was not dealt with in the literature. We have revisited the scenario of Bresson et al. to enable users' devices to join and leave the group as they move from one wireless domain to the next. Providing this 'dynamic' feature in a secure way is not easy, but of primary importance to wireless networks. Consequently, the password-based protocol needs to dynamically update the group session key so that entering and leaving users do not gain access to previously exchanged messages. The group session key can not also be static but needs to be refreshed at regular intervals to prevent cryptanalysis (Borisov et al., 2001) . Dynamicity in the membership and single-shared password among the group members seem two counter-intuitive notions at first. How can a user be forced to leave when everyone in the group shares the same password? When a user leaves the remaining group members exchange a new password by -as in the case of conference meeting -writing it on the board or -as in the case of home networking -keying the new password in each of the users' devices. The latter scenario is made more practical using pairwise-shared passwords among the group members.
Our third contribution is a more meaningful security result since security against dictionary attacks is achieved in the ideal-hash model (i.e. random oracles); unlike Bresson et al. (2002a) who achieve it in both the ideal-cipher and ideal-hash models. We have leveraged these researchers' formalization, wherein group members are modelled as oracles and the attacks of the adversary through queries to these oracles, to reach this cryptographic result. The protocol is a one-mask Group Open Diffie-Hellman Key Encrypted (GOKE)-in the sense of (Bresson et al., 2004; Mackenzie, 2001 Mackenzie, , 2002 -since not all the flows of the original group Diffie-Hellman key exchange are encrypted but only the down-flow. The protocol indeed minimizes the use of the 'encryption' function (i.e. a mask-generation function) and is provably secure in the ideal-hash model and under the standard Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption. The ideal-hash assumption is easier for engineers to implement than the ideal-cipher model since engineers just have to replace it with a straightforward construction from SHA-1 (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) . The end result is a secure password-based authenticated group Diffie-Hellman protocol well-suited to the IEEE 802.11i standard.
Organisation of this paper: our paper is organized as follows. In the rest of this section, we summarize the related work. In Section 2, we recall the formalization proposed by Bresson et al. (2002a) to model security against dictionary attacks in the group setting and refer the reader to their paper for further details on this model. In Section 3, we present the intractability assumptions upon which the security of the protocol is based. In Section 4, we describe the password-authenticated GOKE protocol, while Section 5 is devoted to the security analysis. We finally conclude this paper.
Related work
The cryptographic literature on designing secure protocols for password-authenticated key exchange is quite voluminous. Protocols for two-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Diffie and Hellman, 1976 ) have been proposed and refined for over a decade. The seminal work in this area is the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) protocol proposed by Merritt (1992, 1993) in the early 1990s. Security researchers, however, were only recently able to come up with formal arguments to support the security of the complete suite of EKE protocols Bresson et al., 2003 Bresson et al., , 2004 Boyko et al., 2000; Mackenzie, 2001 Mackenzie, , 2002 Instantiations for the encryption primitive are either password-keyed symmetric ciphers Bresson et al., 2003) or mask-generation functions computed as the product of the message with the hash of a password Boyko et al., 2000; Bresson et al., 2004; Mackenzie, 2001 Mackenzie, , 2002 . Recently, Abdalla et al. proposed an original mask-generation function computed as the product of the message with a constant value raised to the power of the password ; this new mask generation function alleviates the need of a full-domain hash function in the group. Security researchers also provided constructions secured in the standard model based on general computational assumptions, the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (using a variant of the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme) or even strong computational assumptions; however, these construction are not efficient enough for practical use (Goldreich and Lindell, 2001; Katz et al., 2001) . Engineers are now given a suite of secure protocols to choose from depending on their security requirements (ideal-cipher model versus ideal-hash model) and the constraints of their software (one-flow or two-flows of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange are encrypted).
In the light of these recent developments it was natural to provide engineers with a suite of secure password-authenticated group Diffie-Hellman protocols. Password-based protocols for the group setting have not been studied as extensively as the two-party case. Bresson et al. (2002a) adapted the formal model of and defined in it the execution of a password-authenticated group Diffie-Hellman protocol. The protocol is the original group Diffie-Hellman key exchange (Steiner et al., 1996) with the flows randomized and encrypted using a symmetric cipher keyed with a single password shared among the group members (Bresson et al., 2002a) . The protocol, however, does not allow the parties to join and leave the group at any time which is a feature of prime importance to the IEEE 802.11 standards since users join and leave a group as they move from one wireless realm to another. Bresson et al. protocol is secure against dictionary attacks in both the ideal-cipher and random-oracle models.
This paper extends the work of Bresson et al. (2002a) to allow dynamicity in the membership, pairwise-shared passwords and stronger security results.
The model
Players: the players belongs to a non-empty set U of n users who can participate in the group Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol P . A player U i ∈ U may have many instances called oracles involved in distinct executions of P . The players also share a low-entropy secret pw taken from a small dictionary Password of size N. This password pw follows a certain distribution D pw (uniform or not) in the Password set. The probability D pw (q) to be in the most probable set of q passwords is denoted as follows:
where D pw (q) = q/#Password = q/N when the distribution is uniform. Queries: the adversary A and its interactions with the players are modelled by the following queries:
• Execute(U): the adversary gets access to honest executions of the protocol. A gets back the protocol flows of an honest execution of the protocol P between the players.
• Send(U i , m): A sends a message to the oracle U i and gets back the response oracle U i generates in processing the message m according to P . A initializes the protocol using the Send(U 1 , Start)-query and gets back the flow the first player should send out to the second player.
• Reveal(U i ): this query is only available to A if oracle U i holds a session key. A gets back the session key hold by an oracle.
• T est(U i ): the query can be only asked once by A, and is answered by flipping a coin b and forwarding the value of
Dealing separately with the Execute and Send-queries is especially significant in the password-based setting.
In effect the number of Execute-queries reflects the number of off-line attempts the adversary can make to guess the password, while the number of Send-queries reflects the (online) attacks, thus the number of passwords, he may have tried. Security against dictionary attacks is achieved when the security bound does not depend on the number of Execute-queries, but tightly on D pw (q s ), where q s is the number of Send-queries.
Security notions: the notion of AKE Security needs to be achieved in the setting of game Game ake (A, P ):
• Game ake (A, P ) is initialized by providing coin tosses to A, all U i , and then:
-provide each player with a password pw distributed in Password -initialize any U i with sk U i ← NULL -initialize adversary A with 1 and oracle access to all U i -run adversary A and answer queries made by A and -at the end of the game, A outputs its guess b for the bit b involved in the Test-query.
• AKE security: in an execution of P , we say that A wins if it asks a single Test-query to a Fresh player U and correctly guesses the bit b used in Game ake (A, P ). An oracle U i is said to be Fresh (or holds a Fresh key sk) if t i has computed a session key sk = NULL and neither t i nor one of its partners has been asked for a Reveal-query. The AKE advantage is denoted Adv ake P (A) = 2 Pr[b = b ] − 1, where the probability space is over all the random coins of the adversary and all the oracles.
The computational assumptions
CDH assumption: let's G = g be a cyclic group of prime order q. A (t, )-CDH-attacker for G is a probabilistic Turing machine running in time t that given the triplet (g, g x , g y ), can find g xy with probability greater than . We denote this probability Succ cdh G ( ):
let n ∈ N be a parameter denoting the number of participants that can join the group, I n be {1, . . . , n}, P(I n ) be the set of all subsets of I n and T n be the trigon subset of P(I n ) as described below, which does not contain I n :
The trigon structure for n = 4 is represented on Figure 1 . Let also GDH T n be the set:
..,x n with probability greater than . We denote this probability Succ
Relation between TG-CDH and CDH: the TG-CDH problem has been used previously in the literature and shown to be equivalent to the CDH problem (Bresson et al., 2002a,b) . The TG-CDH is random self-reducible which means that an instance D T n (x 1 , . . . , x n ) can easily be transformed in an instance D T n (x 1 α 1 , . . . , x n α n ), by exponentiating the appropriate elements in the trigon (less than n 2 /2 exponentiations). The solution of the first one is S = g x 1 ...x n , while the solution of the second one is S = g
The password-based GOKE
In this section, we present the protocol for password-based authenticated GOKE.
Preliminaries
Let H 0 , H 1 and H 2 denote three hash functions and f denotes the encryption function (this latter function is in practice instantiated by a mask-generation function computed as the product of the message with a constant value raised to the power of the password .) We will also use the transformation ψ which takes as input
For example, the n-th sequential call is computed as X i+1 = ψ(X i , x i ) (starting at X 1 = {g}).
Algorithm
The protocol consists of an up-flow and a down-flow as depicted on Figure 2 . In the up-flow, upon receiving i
as the values to be forwarded to the next player.
At the same time, in order to prove consistency in the generated messages, which is required for the security analysis, the player also sends W i = g x i together with a flow-dependent, signature of knowledge for x i and the correct computation of the new values from the ones he received. Player U i computes the following knowledge proof
. This player then forwards all the received values.
Technical details: it is easy to compute the needed ValidityProof (non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge), by a Schnorr's like non-interactive version of the proof of knowledge (Schnorr, 1990) using the Fiat-Shamir paradigm (Fiat and Shamir, 1987) , in the random oracle model (Bellare and Rogaway, 1993) , as follows. Recall player U i has received in the up-flow F i a vector (X 1 , . . . , X i ) and holds a fresh, randomly chosen Diffie-Hellman exponent x i for the group key exchange. In order to generate the proof of validity for Formally speaking, we assume player U 1 to receive F 1 = {g} and ValidityProof 1 being the empty string. This means that each player receives all the values computed by Figure 2 An honest execution of the password-authenticated Diffie-Hellman GOKE protocol with four players
previous players, together with their proofs of validity. He thus has to check all of them before computing his flow.
In the down-flow, upon receiving F n of length n (as well as the proof ValidityProof n ), the last player U n chooses a random exponent x n and computes (K 1 , . . . , K n , K) = ψ(F n , x n ). We thus have K = g x 1 ,...,x n as the last component. And for each i = 1, . . . , n, we have K i = K 1/x i . Then the player U n chooses randomly and independently n − 1 elements α i ∈ Z q and sets K i = K α i i for i < n. These values are used for the authentication. More precisely, let pw i be the password common to U n and U i (in case of a single-shared password, we have pw i = pw for all i); U n sends to every other player U i the challenge K i = K i · U pw i . The player authenticates itself to the last player as follows. Upon receiving a challenge K i , each player U i raises the 'unmasked' challenge to the power of its private exponent x i and sends the resulting hash value as its authenticator: 
Rationale
Two ingredients are essential from the security view point: proofs of validity and key confirmation steps before the last player communicates the K i 's. Otherwise, an adversary could send non-valid flows and then introduce redundancy which could help to perform a dictionary attack: assume that A tries to impersonate U 1 and thus sends incorrect values {g, U r } to U 2 . The latter playing honestly will send {g x 2 , U r , U rx 2 }. Knowing r, the adversary learns U x 2 . On top of that, A also tries to impersonate the group controller and sends K * 2 = U s , for a known s. The authenticator sent back by U 2 is derived from (U x 2 ) s−pw , a value easily tested by the adversary, for all the passwords: a dictionary attack.
Practical considerations
The GOKE protocol can be used with different passwords shared between each group member U i and the last member U n in the group. GOKE can also be made more efficient and therefore more practical, by allowing U n to verify all the proofs of knowledge once rather than by letting each player U i verifies the proof of knowledge one at a time. This enables U n to batch the verification of the knowledge proofs and to speed-up the verification phase by a factor 2 (Bellare et al., 1998; M'Raïhi and Naccache, 1996) .
It is also straightforward to allow users to join and leave the group in the course of the GOKE protocol (Bresson et al., 2001) . When one or more players are added to the group, the last player U n initiates a sequence of up-flows, (an example for n = 4 is represented on Figure 3 ) starting from him (rather than from the first player): he simply recomputes ψ(F n , x n ) with a new, fresh exponent x n then the protocol continues up to the last joining player, who becomes the subsequent group controller. Note that the values ψ(F n , x n ) had been previously used in the authentication, however they were sent in the clear (i.e. were not masked with the password), so no additional information is leaked when performing the join operation. Similarly, when players leave the group, the group controller sends authenticator to the remaining players, by using fresh, new exponents. Here again, since the authentication procedures are done pairwise and independently, the leaving players cannot gain any useful information. 
The security analysis
In this section, we prove that the GOKE protocol is secure against dictionary attacks under the group CDH assumption and in the random-oracle model (at first we do not, like Bresson et al., addresses concurrent executions of the protocol).
Theorem 1: Let A be an attacker against the scheme described in Figure 2 , in which the password is drawn from a dictionary of size N according to distribution D pw . Let q H and q s be the number of Hash and Send-queries the adversary is allowed to make, respectively. Then we have: Proof: We consider in the following sequence of games the event S defined as b = b , where b is the underlying, random bit used in the Test-query and b is the bit returned by the adversary. The semantic security aims to make Pr[S] negligibly close to 1/2. Game G 0 : this is the real game, in which we make every player performing the actions as specified in the protocol (exponentiations of received flows, hashing, etc.). Also we simulate the random oracles in a classical way, maintaining lists of already asked values, together with the corresponding answers. In this game, we have by definition:
Game G 1 : in this game, the simulated authenticators and the final session key are computed using private random oracles H 1 , H 2 and H 0 in place of H 1 , H 2 and H 0 , respectively. More precisely, we do not compute the values of K i (neither K) anymore and set:
We stress that these values are perfectly random for the adversary, since the random oracles are private to the simulator. Thus the probability for the adversary of successfully forging an authenticator is at most q s /2 , unless a collision appeared on the SID defined as r 1 ... r n (which is bounded by q 2 s /2 s ). Excepted these bad cases, the semantic security of the session key is now perfect (since it is computed using a random oracle the adversary has not access to):
Moreover, the two games are indistinguishable unless the attacker asks one of the 'bad' values (r 1 ... r n , i, K α i ) to the random oracle, 1 which event is denoted AskH. The remaining of the proof is thus devoted to upper-bound the probability of such event.
Game G 2 : we show how to simulate the instances of the players without knowing the exponents. We assume we are given a TG-CDH- instance D(a 1 , . . . , a n ). Since we have access to the extractors associated to any proof of knowledge (as explained in the Appendix), we can properly deal with the cases the received values have been built by the adversary. We make use of this functionality to embed the instance D in the protocol flows: we simulate the protocol by answering each Send(U i , F i )-query by extracting all exponents put in it by the adversary (for the players he is controlling); we then 'remove' these exponents and obtain a line of the trigon. Taking the next line, we then 'reintroduce' the adversary's exponents. On top of that, we randomize the process by using multiplicative random self-reducibility (with known randomizing exponents) to process multiple queries asked to the same player: this essentially adds at most n exponentiations per Send-query (the Execute-queries are simulated by simply randomizing the instance D). The last call (if asked to player U n ) provides us with values K i , that we use to compute the challenges K * i . Recall that we do not have to compute the values K i nor K, then the remaining of the protocol (authentication flows) is easily simulated.
The following (basic) lemma shows that such a simulation is always possible: The proof uses a simple induction on t. Also we introduce the notation t = φ(i); this simply means that player U i is simulated using the line L φ(i) of the instance D. In other words, U i implicitly makes use of the exponent a φ(i) .
We easily see that the simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from the previous game, if conditioned to the success probability of correctly extracting the adversary's exponents. Then we get (according to section A and letting = Pr[AskH 1 ]):
However, the simulation is a bit more expensive:
for any ≥ Pr[AskH 1 ]/2. The former contribution is for the random-self reduction, while the latter is for the extraction (see Appendix). We now derive two games, in order to analyze the probability of passive or active attacks. We first analyze active attacks.
Game G 3 : in this game, we show how to upper-bound the probability of event AskH. To do so, we modify the way the challenges K * i are computed, in such a way that the password is not used anymore and becomes information-theoretically hidden to the adversary. Indeed, we note that the challenges K * i are independent, random elements in G, so we just simulate them by choosing a random exponent α i and sets
Intuitively we study what A can do/learn on the authentication flows between U n and U i .
Several cases may then appear, each of them leads to a specific bounds. These cases correspond to the attacks the adversary can mount against the two-party authentications (between the last player and another one). We stress that these cases are disjoint because we focus on the first occurrence of the 'bad' hash-query; thus the global upper-bound is just the sum. Much more important, the simulation is identical in these three cases, so we do not need to condition by the probability of having correctly 'guessed' the case. For evaluating AskH, we postpone the choice of the password after the answer of the adversary.
Case AskH 1 : the value K * i is sent by the simulator, but U i has not been simulated -in this case, A is likely to know the underlying x i so we just notice the following. If AskH 1 happens, the query K α i asked by A is equal to (U α i −pw ) x i , but, as said above, the password can be chosen at the very end of the protocol. The probability of such an event is thus upper-bounded by D pw (q s ).
Case AskH 2 : the value K * i is sent by the simulator, and U i has been simulated as well -as described before, the challenges K * i are simulated by random elements U α i , and the password is chosen at the very end, being thus independent from A's view. Our goal in this last case is to show that, even if A controls some player U j (knowing x j ), it cannot learn useful information from the U i ↔ U n authentication. More precisely, because A does not know a φ(i) , he cannot ask the query K i without (implicitly) breaking the CDH problem. The following lemma formally proves this. . We first notice that all flows sent in the protocol are of the form g j ∈J x j ; this is due to the fact that each flow is sent with a ValidityProof proof. The consequence is that the discrete logarithms of U in any of these values remains unknown (otherwise one could easily get log g U by removing the exponents embedded by A). Now let us assume that there exist two queries Z and Z in the H-list, satisfying:
By division, we get Z/Z = DH(U, W i ) π −π . Since π = π and the group order is a prime, we can set w = (π − π) −1 mod q. It follows that DH(U, W i ) = (Z/Z ) w . As noticed above, this value cannot be computed from the flows themselves. Thus, unless the adversary can solve this Diffie-Hellman instance, he can test at most one password when sending a challenge K * . If the adversary forges an authenticator Auth i , one shows that A cannot guess the password better than at random since neither the players' authenticators nor the challenges provide information on it; indeed, all these values are simulated by pure random strings or elements. Therefore the probability that A makes a H 2 -query that helps to distinguish the games is upper-bounded by D pw (q s ).
This leads to Pr[AskH Gathering the three cases, we obtain (for active attacks):
Game G 4 : it remains to deal with passive attacks. In a passive eavesdropping, we note that all exponents are successively embedded in the protocol flows using the ψ function (i.e., φ(i) = i) and that the session key is derived from the TG-CDH secret (by the random self-reduction known to the simulator). Also we note that the challenges K * i as well as the values K i can be properly simulated, without any additional material (these values are included in the last line of the trigon instance).
In such a game, the probability that A asks the value (r 1 ... r n , K) to the random oracle H 0 is easily related to the probability of solving the TG-CDH-problem for the instance D:
Putting all together, we obtain the claimed result. Schnorr, C.P. (1990) 
